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I. Introduction
Korea's economic development over the past 25 years was based on industrialization with priority being given to the manufacturing sectors at the expense of services.
However, since the financial crisis of late 1997, the importance of the service sector has been increasingly recognized and comprehensive reforms in the service sector were recommended in order to restore the crisis-ridden economy to its previous growth path (McKinsey, 1998) .
The liberalization of services can bring potential gains in productivity in service sectors that are subject to technology transfers and economies of scale. These are similar to the productivity effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the manufacturing sector, since a significant portion of service supplies occur through FDI.
Various studies show positive evidence of the productivity spillovers of foreign direct investment (Caves, 1974; Globerman, 1979; Blomstrom and Persson, 1983; Borensztein, de Gregorio and Lee, 1998) . Foreign investment may also raise productivity by enhancing competition. Based on an analysis of approximately 670 U.K. companies, Nickell (1996) showed that competition, as measured by increased numbers of competitors or by lower levels of rents, is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity growth. Using firm-level panel data of U.S. automobile component manufacturers, Chung, Mitchell and Yeung (1994) found that productivity gains among the host country suppliers largely stem from the increase in competition created by foreign direct investment.
Moreover, the liberalization of trade in services may result in improved productivity in other sectors, including manufacturing, due to the resulting access to a broader variety, better quality and lower cost of inputs. Using a model of increasing returns due to specialization, Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1992) argued that foreign direct investment in the business service sector stimulates specialization and raises the productivity of the industry that uses them. Markusen (1989) also demonstrated that allowing trade in producer services is superior to allowing trade in final goods only, due to the complementarity between domestic and foreign producer services.
This paper investigates the changes in productivity growth rates of Korean service and manufacturing subsectors in relation to the liberalization of trade in services. Since
Korea underwent accelerated liberalization of the service sector in the 1990s, we try to examine whether the service subsectors which were liberalized, and the manufacturing subsectors which use liberalized services as inputs, experienced productivity gains in this period.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the evolution of liberalization in services in Korea, as well as the recent trends of trade in services. Section III illustrates the case of distribution services, which were liberalized almost completely in the 1990s. Changes in productivity in the service and manufacturing subsectors are explored in Section IV by tabulating the trends of labor and total factor productivity. We then investigate whether liberalized service subsectors posted relatively higher productivity growth and contributed to productivity gains in the manufacturing subsectors. Concluding remarks and policy implications are provided in Section V.
II. Evolution of Services Liberalization and Recent Trends of Trade in Services

Evolution of services liberalization
Unlike the manufacturing sector in which FDI had been liberalized since the early 1980s, much of the services liberalization has only taken place since the mid-1990s. 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Remaining Restricted 
Recent trends of trade in services
The service sector is gaining importance in the Korean economy, with its share of GDP and employment having increased from 43.9 percent and 39.5 percent in 1980 to 52.7 percent and 59.8 percent in 1998, respectively. However, the share of the service sector in the domestic economy is lower than that of the United States, Singapore, and Japan, where its portion of the GDP in 1996 was 74.1 percent, 70.9 percent and 64.4 percent, respectively. Table 4 reveals that a significant increase in trade in services occurred, through commercial presence, since the 1980s. FDI inflows in services increased from $1.6 billion in 1982-90 to $6.3 billion in 1998-99. Hotels were the largest recipients through the 1980s. In the 1990s, FDI increased remarkably in distribution services (wholesale and retail), transportation services, financial services and other services, which are mainly composed of business services. FDI in distribution services increased from $20.1 million in 1982-90 to $586.6 million in 1996-97. FDI in transportation services also increased, from $9.9 million in 1991-95 to $150.2 million in 1996-97. FDI in financial services and other services experienced a sharp increase after the financial crisis. FDI in financial services increased from $480.8 million in 1996-97 to $2.3 billion in 1998-99. The increase in FDI in other services was almost six fold during the same period, from $367.4 million in 1996-97 to $1.8 billion in 1998-99. 
III. The Experience of Liberalization in Distribution Services
In this section, we focus on the distribution sector, which experienced a significant liberalization during the 1990s, to illustrate how liberalization affects the productivity of a specific sector.
Distribution services had been one of the least developed sectors in Korea, up to the mid-1990s, along with financial services. Mom-and-pop stores having fewer than five employees accounted for approximately 80 percent of Korea's $116 billion retail market in 1996. The productivity of Korea's wholesale and retail service sector, in terms of sales per establishment or sales per employee, was far below that of Japan in 1994 (Table 5 ). However, a remarkable transformation has taken place in Korea's distribution industry since the government lifted some of the restrictions that kept foreign service suppliers out of the country before 1996 (Table 6) . 3 In particular, store-and spacerelated limits on retailing were eliminated for both domestic and foreign retail firms. As a result, a number of large-sized discount stores or hyper-markets have been established by both domestic and foreign firms since 1996. The total number of hyper-market stores will reach 164 in 2000 and almost 30 percent of them will have been established by foreign firms (Table 7) .
The increasing number of hyper-markets is changing the manufacturer-dominated structure of the Korean retail industry which had deterred productivity improvements and price competition. The increased buying-power of the hyper-markets puts price determining in the hands of retailers rather than manufacturers, leading to price competition. Foreign retail firms also transferred advanced techniques in merchandising and inventory management, as well as new technologies, such as point of sales (POS) systems. the Korean distribution sector may be regarded as worse with much smaller establishments in terms of their size. 4 However, since in the mid-1990s, the number of establishments in retailing began to decline, while the size continued to grow. During this period, the domestic retailing sector began to be exposed to foreign competition as foreign firms started to enter the market as shown in Table 7 . Ito and Maruyama(1991) and Anwar and Taku (1993) . in 1995 to 13.6 percent and 21.7 percent in 1998, respectively (Table 9 ). This reveals that the supermarkets and department stores face direct challenges from foreign competitors.
In sum, a rough observation of the measures of efficiency points to enhanced productivity of the Korean distribution services with the liberalization in the 1990s, although we cannot provide definite evidence due to the limited data. Particularly, the inflow of FDI with the opening of hyper-markets by foreign firms introduced best practice management and challenged domestic retail stores. In addition, changing shopping patterns with the introduction of discount stores may have forced many small stores to specialize their services, and existing domestic retail firms to enlarge their size to take advantage of scale effect. 
IV. Changes in Productivity Growth Rates 5
This section investigates whether or not the productivity changes in the service and manufacturing sectors in the 1990s were associated with services liberalization. We first compare the level of labor productivity of the Korean service industry with those in some of the advanced countries. The growth rates of labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) in the Korean service sector since 1970 are then examined. Finally, we will try to see whether or not productivity growth in the manufacturing sector is associated with services liberalization.
Sectoral labor productivity: an international comparison
In Note: "utilities" denote electricity, water and gas. "distribution, etc" denotes retail, wholesale, restaurants and hotels. "finance, etc" denote finance, insurance, real estate and business services. "social services, etc" denote community, social and personal services. The figure is for the comparison of retail and wholesale trade only, excluding restaurants and hotels. ** The figure is for the comparison of finance and insurance only, excluding real estate. Table 10 shows that, in 1990, the labor productivity of the Korean service sector, except for "utilities," was much lower than that of the United States, the European countries and Japan. The labor productivity of "construction" and "finance, etc." in Korea was about 40 percent that of the U.S. Even worse was the labor productivity of "distribution, etc." and "social services, etc.," which were 18 percent and 15 percent of U.S. levels, respectively. Table 11 tabulates the growth rates of productivity in the Korean service subsectors since 1970. "finance, etc.," practically closed to foreign suppliers until the late 1990s, experienced the worst performance with negative growth rates in labor productivity throughout the period, except for 1985-90. It was during this period that the Korean economy was booming with a large trade surplus. Whereas, "distribution, etc.," which was almost completely liberalized in 1996, and "transport and communication," which was partially liberalized in the 1990s, showed increases in labor productivity in the late 1990s, from 5.09 percent and 0.41 percent in 1990-95 to 7.17 percent and 1.54 percent in 1995-97, respectively.
Productivity growth in services
Table 11
Annual average growth rates for labor productivity in service subsectors,
Korea, 1970-1997
Period
Manufactu ring
Constructi on
Utilities Transport ation, Communication Distribution, etc.
Finance, etc. Social Services, etc.
Total Economy
Since labor productivity is influenced by the magnitude of capital, which is affected by FDI inflows, we next compare changes in total factor productivity in the same period.
Total factor productivity is defined as:
where Y, K and L are output, capital and labor inputs, respectively and α is the elasticity of the production of capital. Thus, total factor productivity (TFP) growth is calculated as the residual of output growth net of the weighted growth of factor inputs. The underlying assumption is to use the factor shares in total costs as factor weights under constant returns to scale, Hicks neutral technical progress and the profit maximization of firms in competitive markets. In our study, we consider two inputs, capital and labor.
It is desirable to adjust capital and labor inputs by their quality measures. However, the data on the quality of inputs at the sectoral level is not available. We use gross fixed capital stock for capital inputs and total employment for labor inputs. It is also desirable to have actually utilized input levels by using working hours and utilized capital.
However, the data on hours worked, both for capital and labor, is limited in its use for our purposes. Regarding working hours, the published data concerns the hours paid rather than hours actually worked. Also, the capacity utilization rate at the subsector level is not available, particularly for the service sectors. Therefore, due to the failure to allow for cyclical variations in hours worked and capacity utilization, there is a cyclical bias to our measurements of TFP growth in the short run. However, this problem is lessened in the long run by the booms being offset by recessions. Table 11 shows that similar patterns can be detected for changes in total factor productivity. As was the case for labor productivity, "finance, etc." recorded negative TFP growth rates throughout the period, except for 1985-90. "transport and communications" showed a gain in TFP growth in the late 1990s, from 2.2 percent in 1990-95 to 4.12 percent in 1995-97. The trend of TFP growth for "distribution, etc." also improved in the late 1990s, from -0.41 percent in 1990-95 to -0.02 percent in 1995-97. However, we cannot strictly prove that productivity improvement was caused by liberalization in services from the trend of labor productivity and TFP growth. As already mentioned, the two measures of efficiency considered above are subject to cyclical fluctuations and there may be a time lag for the liberalization measure to take effect on sector-wide productivity change. Considering that meaningful liberalization in the Korean service sectors has only been implemented since the mid-1990s, it may be too early to demonstrate any causal relationship between productivity changes and services liberalization.
Contribution of services liberalization to manufacturing
The hypothesis that liberalization in services may increase the productivity of manufacturing subsectors which use liberalized services as inputs can be examined by comparing the growth rates of productivity by manufacturing subsectors (Table 13 ) and
the input coefficients of services to those manufacturing subsectors (Table 14) . For "nonmetals," which had a negative TFP growth rate of -0.06 percent in 1990-97, we can notice that the input coefficient of distribution services, which were liberalized in the 1990s, was 0.018, relatively lower than the input coefficients of the other service subsectors. Thus, "nonmetals," which use the liberalized service subsector less intensively, shows poor performance in terms of TFP growth rates when compared with other manufacturing subsectors.
However, it seems to be difficult to extract any consistent pattern from the growth rates of the TFP in the manufacturing subsectors and their input coefficients of the service subsectors. In general, the sum of the input coefficients of services in the manufacturing subsectors is in the range of 0.1 and 0.17, which is not large enough to make a significant impact on their productivity. 
V. Concluding Remarks
Due to industrialization that had put priorities to manufacturing at the expense of services, the service sector in Korea was grossly underdeveloped prior to the early 1990s. Numerous sector specific regulations and restrictions on FDI prevented competition and impeded the offering of higher value services. In 1990, the labor productivity of the Korean service subsectors was much lower than that of the advanced countries. The labor productivity of "distribution services, etc.," in particular, was less than one-fifth that of the U.S. in 1990.
Since the mid-1990s, the Uruguay Round negotiations and OECD accession enabled The liberalization of services is presumed to bring productivity gains in the service sector and also in the manufacturing sectors that use liberalized services as inputs. In searching for some evidence of this in Korea, we examined the changes in productivity of the service and manufacturing subsectors in 1970-97. Since liberalization had taken place in the 1990s, and it takes time to see the full effects of liberalization, it is too early to give a definite answer to whether liberalization in services has caused an increase in productivity in Korea. However, we see a productivity improvement in such a sector as distribution services, which had a large inflow of FDI with liberalization in the 1990s.
Considering the positive impacts of liberalization of trade in services on domestic economy, it is in the interest of the Korean economy to continue its liberalization process and refrain from retreating. As entry barriers have been widely removed, most remaining obstacles are the internal barriers faced by both foreign and domestic suppliers. These barriers are more difficult to remove because they are part operating practices, part regulation and part cultural.
In particular, the ambiguous tax laws as well as cumbersome regulations are regarded as the most serious impediment to foreign investors (KOTRA, 1998) . A common problem faced by foreign businessmen is that regulations are subject to various interpretation by different regulatory authorities. This implies that deregulation should focus not only on reducing the number of regulations, but also on enhancing transparent enforcement.
In the process of deregulation, the government should also be attentive to reducing excessive regulations for fulfilling their objectives. In the case of financial service sector, there are minimum investment requirements in terms of paid-in capital. These requirements are considered prudential regulations but foreign investors complain that this requirement is so excessive as to deter entry by smaller investors (Kim, 1999) .
Another important area which has not been adequately addressed is labor market inflexibility. In Korea, layoffs are still difficult to execute on a large scale and are allowed only in case of emergency. The limitations on layoffs may discourage foreign service suppliers in establishing local subsidiaries, which otherwise can create employment. Establishing an adequate social safety net and effective retraining programs is thus needed not only because it enhances labor market flexibility but also because it enables the government to liberalize mode 4---temporary entry of service providers.
employees under the assumption that the compensation of the self-employed is comparable to that of the employed. That is,
The share of labor in value added = (compensation of employees + (compensation of employees/total employees) x (total employment -total employees))/ value added.
The data on the compensation of employees and current value added are taken from the National Accounts. The number of total employees is taken from the ILO Statistical Yearbook and the Employment Table of the Bank of Korea. The share of agriculture and fisheries, communities, social and personal services, retail and wholesale trade, and restaurants and hotels, computed as above, are too high. The employment of these industries shows that a large proportion of unpaid family workers may be underemployed. Thus, when comparing with some of the advanced countries from the ISDB, we assumed that the unpaid workers were compensated at half the rate of paid workers. After adjustment, the shares of labor in value added for these industries were comparable to the estimate of Kim and Park (1985) .
Finally, the data on some of the advanced countries used for international comparison was taken from the International Sectoral Database of the OECD, which provides the sectoral output and input data of OECD countries from 1970 to 1990.
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